History Repeated

One of the books that I'm reading at present is The Peloponnesian War: Athens and Sparta in Savage Conflict 431-404BC, by the historian Donald Kagan (Harper Perennial, London, 2005).

The Peloponnesian War was a series of disastrous conflicts between the rival city states of Sparta and Athens between 472 and 404BC. They had emerged from the Persian Wars of the previous century as the premier city-states of the Greek civilisation: Athens built up a maritime league which, over time, became a subject empire; Sparta became the dominant land power, famed for its military might and the militant rigidity of its society. Without going into details, the Peloponnesian War eventually drew in all the city states of Greece, exhausting both Sparta and Athens, and leaving the way open for the subsequent subjugation of Greece by Phillip of Macedon, and his son Alexander the Great.

I recently read a section of the book discussing the disastrous Athenian campaign in Sicily, which ended in the annihilation of the entire expedition, and came across the following remarkable passage:

Most historians agree with Thucydides in blaming the continuation of the Sicilian campaign on the greed, ignorance and foolishness of the direct Athenian democracy. But the behaviour of the Athenians on this occasion is the opposite of the flighty indecision that is usually imputed to their democracy. They showed constancy and determination to carry through what they had begun, in spite of the setbacks and disappointments. Their error, in fact, is one common to powerful states, regardless of their constitutions, when they are unexpectedly thwarted by an opponent they anticipated would be weak and easily defeated. Such states are likely to view retreat as a blow to their prestige, and while unwelcome in itself, it is also an option that puts into question their strength and determination and with it their security. Support for ventures such as the Sicilian campaign generally remains strong until the prospect of victory disappears. (p. 296)

Do I really need to spell out the parallels which this conclusion has with respect to the present damnable tragedy in Iraq? Who, upon reading this passage, could not help but conclude that the situation facing the Athenian republic in Sicily is the same which now faces the so-called "Coalition of the Willing"? Let's tease out the strands from Kagan's conclusions, and see what they hold for us today.

1. The expectation of victory. Clearly, those who planned the invasion of Iraq expected a clear and decisive victory after only a relatively short period of combat. In part, this expectation was based on the experience from the First Gulf War, in which US-led forces routed the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Mostly, however, it seems clear that the leaders of the "Coalition" simply didn't expect the level of domestic opposition that has materialised in the years since "military operations" ended. Indeed, they expected to be welcomed as liberators, as saviours from the tyranny of the Hussein regime. And, in the beginning, it seemed as though these expectations were justified. The Iraqi forces were routed a second time, and the remnant militia resistance crushed after a further, although acceptable, period of fighting. Since that time, unfortunately, Iraq has become a cause celebre for jihadists - just as Afghanistan did during the Soviet occupation of that country. Moreover, militant Sunnis, who were in power during the Hussein regime, have coalesced into an effective resistance against the occupying forces, and the majority Shia and minority Kurdish populations. The expectations of victory have thus dissolved as the conflict in Iraq has morphed into a multi-faceted war - both an armed struggle for liberation and a civil war between competing ethnic and denominational groups - which the planners of the Iraqi invasions clearly didn't foresee.

2. The blow to prestige. As the situation in Iraq has steadily deteriorated, the leaders of the US, UK, and Australia have repeatedly urged that we "stay the course", that we not "cut and run", and thereby "hand victory" to the "terrorists". In recent times, these statements have taken the form of arguing that any withdrawal from Iraq before "the job is finished" would hand the jihadists a massive propaganda victory upon which they could recruit further adherents and thereby threaten the West directly. What are these arguments other than an appeal that we not, through withdrawal, allow a jihadist-inspired blow to our prestige? Leaving aside the fact that the Iraqi situation will now probably result in some humiliating withdrawal sooner or later - just as was the case in Somalia - it seems clear that the leaders of the "Coalition" realised some time ago what a foreign policy quagmire Iraq had become; thus, appeals to "stay the course" were really just attempts to mitigate their responsibility for the whole fiasco behind an appeal to populist patriotism. Moreover, it seems self-evident, even before any withdrawal has occurred, that the situation in Iraq has placed the West at greater risk of terrorist attack: as the bombings in Madrid, London, and Bali have so appallingly demonstrated. Thus, the appeal to national security is a furphy; that security has already been compromised by the invasion of Iraq itself. But the appeal to prestige is a powerful one, because it is essentially an appeal to national egotism; and it is through pandering to this egotism that popular support for the invasion has been sustained for so long.

3. Popular support. At the time of the invasion of Iraq, public opinion - at least, Australian public opinion - was decidedly against the intervention. However, this quickly swung around in the aftermath of the speedy "Coalition" victory over the conventional forces of the Hussein regime, and the subsequent nullification of the pro-Hussein militia. Moreover, there was a preparedness on the part of many citizens to believe - or, at least, to accept as a valid causus belli - the justifications for the war based on the alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction by the Hussein regime, and of its supposed links to the al-Qaeda terrorist organisation. These factors combined to keep public support for the war in Iraq at high levels for a substantial period of time - long enough, indeed, to ensure the re-election of the Bush, Blair, and Howard governments in the US, UK, and Australia respectively. Now, however, that support has evaporated. In part, this is due to the fact that many people feel they have been lied to by their governments, especially in light of the fact that it has now been demonstrated that the Iraqis did not possess WMDs, nor were there any links between the Hussein regime and al-Qaeda. The reality, however, is that there was a substantial and vocal minority in the countries of the "Coalition" who were articulating these truths at the time of the invasion. In other words, public support for the Iraqi invasion has disappeared largely because the citizenry now recognise the conflict for the lost cause that it is, and feel both the embarrassment to national pride this occasions, as well as a sense of shared culpability for the disaster. Public opinion has shifted because a swift victory has not eventuated, a victory that might otherwise have enabled the public to salve its guilty conscience.

The upshot of all this is that the "Coalition of the Willing" now finds itself in precisely the same situation as the Athenian city-state: having over-extended its resources, it now faces a catastrophic military defeat, as well as the socio-political-economic consequences arising from that defeat. Indeed, it is not clear that the "Coalition" will be able to maintain itself in those spheres where its activities are universally acknowledged to be legitimate - such as Afghanistan, for example. And that will undoubtedly produce the kind of propaganda coup the jihadists are longing for: a coup they will be able to exploit for recruitment purposes. Thus, the security of the West has already been undermined on two fronts: by the short-sightedness and dishonesty of those who planned the invasion of Iraq; and by their stubbornness that has made a bad situation worse.

And the accessories in this whole melancholy affair are the public, who, for the sake of expediency over conscience, allowed themselves to be persuaded to both the justice of the invasion and the merits of the occupation.

Talk to you soon,

BB

Quote for the Day: History is the sum total of the things that could have been avoided. (Konrad Adenauer)